

ICECCS 2020

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Parametric non-interference in timed automata

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Outline

1 Introduction

2 Parametric timed automata

3 Problem

4 Approach

5 Case study

6 Perspectives

Context: security

Security of computer systems

- Threats coming from an intruder or an unsafe medium (Internet)

[Koc96] Paul C. Kocher. “Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems”. In: *CRYPTO* (Aug. 18–22, 1996). Vol. 1109. LNCS. Santa Barbara, California, USA: Springer, 1996, pp. 104–113. doi: 10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9

[Ben+15] Gilles Benattar, Franck Cassez, Didier Lime, and Olivier H. Roux. “Control and synthesis of non-interferent timed systems”. In: *International Journal of Control* 88.2 (2015), pp. 217–236. doi: 10.1080/00207179.2014.944356

[GMR07] Guillaume Gardey, John Mullins, and Olivier H. Roux. “Non-Interference Control Synthesis for Security Timed Automata”. In: *Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science* 180.1 (2007), pp. 35–53. doi: 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.046

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Timed systems: challenging

- time is a potential attack vector against secure systems [Koc96][Ben+15]
- a non-interferent system can become interferent when timing information is added [GMR07]

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Context: non-interference

Measure the **disturbance** of a system

A system is **non-interferent** when some disturbance on some **high-level actions** does not affect the observable behavior (“**low-level**” actions)

When adding **time** information: Question of the **frequency**

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Key point: frequency

Does performing an arbitrary **high-level action** at a **given frequency** disturbs the observable behavior?

- [Bar+02]: observable behavior = timed **language**
- [BT03]: observable behavior = set of **discrete states**

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- [Bar+02]: observable behavior = timed **language**

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Here, we will address a **parametric** version of the problem, and **synthesize** this frequency: **at which frequency** can we perform **high-level actions** without disturbing the observable behavior?

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Timed automaton (TA)


- Finite state automaton (sets of locations)



[AD94] Rajeev Alur and David L. Dill. "A theory of timed automata". In: *Theoretical Computer Science* 126.2 (Apr. 1994), pp. 183–235. ISSN: 0304-3975. DOI: 10.1016/0304-3975(94)90010-8

Timed automaton (TA)


- Finite state automaton (sets of locations and actions)



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
- Finite state automaton (sets of locations and **actions**) augmented with a set X of **clocks** [AD94]
 - Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**



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
- Finite state automaton (sets of locations and **actions**) augmented with a set X of **clocks** [AD94]
 - Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**
 - Can be compared to integer constants in invariants
- Features
 - Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location



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Timed automaton (TA)

- Finite state automaton (sets of locations and **actions**) augmented with a set X of **clocks** [AD94]
 - Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**
 - Can be compared to integer constants in invariants and guards
- Features
 - Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location
 - Transition **guard**: property to be verified to enable a transition



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
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- Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**
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Features

- Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location
- Transition **guard**: property to be verified to enable a transition
- Clock **reset**: some of the clocks can be **set to 0** along transitions




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timed model checking



?

 is unreachable

A **model** of the system


A **property** to be satisfied

■ Question: does the model of the system satisfy the property?

Yes




No



Counterexample

Parametric timed model checking



?

 is unreachable

A **model** of the system

A **property** to be satisfied

- Question: for what values of the parameters does the model of the system satisfy the property?


Yes if...

$$2 \times \text{delay} > 20.46 \times \text{period}$$



Parametric Timed Automaton (PTA)


- Timed automaton (sets of locations, actions and clocks)



[AHV93] Rajeev Alur, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Moshe Y. Vardi. "Parametric real-time reasoning". In: *STOC* (May 16–18, 1993). San Diego, California, United States: ACM, 1993, pp. 592–601. ISBN: 0-89791-591-7. DOI: 10.1145/167088.167242

Parametric Timed Automaton (PTA)

- Timed automaton (sets of locations, actions and clocks) augmented with a set P of parameters [AHV93]
 - Unknown constants compared to a clock in guards and invariants




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Notation: Valuation of a PTA

- Given a PTA \mathcal{A} and a parameter valuation v , we denote by $v(\mathcal{A})$ the (non-parametric) timed automaton where each parameter p is valuated by $v(p)$

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$$\text{with } v : \begin{cases} p_1 & \rightarrow 1 \\ p_2 & \rightarrow 5 \\ p_3 & \rightarrow 8 \end{cases}$$


Concrete semantics of timed automata

- **Concrete state** of a TA: pair (ℓ, w) , where
 - ℓ is a location,
 - w is a **valuation** of each clock


Example: , $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} x=1.2 \\ y=3.7 \end{smallmatrix}\right)$

- **Concrete run**: alternating sequence of **concrete states** and **actions** or **time elapse**

The most critical system: The coffee machine




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


■ Example of concrete run for the coffee machine

■ Coffee with 2 doses of sugar



 $x = 0$
 $y = 0$

The most critical system: The coffee machine




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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n -location-non-interference: Definition

Let $\Sigma = L \uplus H$


- L : low-level actions
- H : high-level actions

Definition


A TA \mathcal{A} is n -location-non-interferent if the sets of reachable locations are equal in the following TAs:

- 1 \mathcal{A} without any high-level action
- 2 \mathcal{A} with high-level actions separated by at least n time units

n -location-non-interference: Example




n -location-non-interference: Example



Fix $p = 1.1$

- 1 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} without any high-level action: $\{\text{green}, \text{red}\}$

n -location-non-interference: Example




Fix $p = 1.1$








- 1 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} without any high-level action: {green, red}
- 2 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} with high-level actions separated by at least 1 time unit: {green, red, blue}

$\Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is **not** 1-location-non-interfering

n -location-non-interference: Example



Fix $p = 1.1$

- 1 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} without any high-level action: {, }
- 2 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} with high-level actions separated by at least 1 time unit: {, , }
- 3 Locations reachable in \mathcal{A} with high-level actions separated by at least 2 time units: {, }

$\Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is **not 1-location-non-interfering**

$\Rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is **2-location-non-interfering**

Problem

Problem: n -location-non-interference **synthesis**

Inputs:

- A **parametric** TA \mathcal{A} with parameters P
- A **parameter** n

Goal:

“Synthesize valuations v of P and of n such that $v(\mathcal{A})$ is n -location-non-interfering.”


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Our approach in a nutshell: Gadget

We take the parallel product of

- \mathcal{A} , and
- a special gadget PTA “ \mathcal{Interf}_H^n ” constraining any high-level action to be separated by at least n time units



Our approach in a nutshell: Reachability synthesis

Then, we compute

- 1 a set of locations G to be reached for some desired property in \mathcal{A}
- 2 the set of **parameter valuations** for which G is reachable in $\mathcal{A} \parallel \mathcal{Interf}_H^n$

Our approach in a nutshell: Reachability synthesis

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Toolkit:

- Semi-algorithm: **reachability synthesis** [JLR15]
 - semi-algorithm: no theoretical guarantee on termination
- implemented in IMITATOR

[JLR15] Aleksandra Jovanović, Didier Lime, and Olivier H. Roux. “Integer Parameter Synthesis for Real-Time Systems”. In: *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering* 41.5 (2015), pp. 445–461. DOI: 10.1109/TSE.2014.2357445

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 - Fischer protocol
 - IMITATOR in a nutshell
 - Results
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Fischer mutual exclusion protocol

Two processes P_1 and P_2 running in parallel compete for the **critical section**.

Atomic reads and writes are permitted to a shared variable ∇

Every access to the shared memory containing ∇ takes *acc* units of time.

Fischer mutual exclusion protocol

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Atomic reads and writes are permitted to a shared variable v

Every access to the shared memory containing v takes acc units of time.

Each process P_i executes the following code:

[BT03]

```
repeat
  await v = 0
  v := i
  delay b
until v = i
v := 0
(* Critical section*)
```

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(* Critical section*)
```

An assignment takes (at most) a time units

Maximum time needed to execute the critical section is ucs

Fischer mutual exclusion protocol

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```
repeat
  await v = 0
  v := i
  delay b
until v = i
v := 0
(* Critical section*)
```

An assignment takes (at most) a time units

Maximum time needed to execute the critical section is ucs

Crux: P_i is allowed into the critical section only when $v = i$

Fischer: intruder

Attacker scheme

An **intruder** can take anytime a high-level transition “*att*”, nondeterministically changing **v** to 0, 1 or 2

Fischer: objective

Objective

Automatically infer conditions over n , a , b , acc and ucs guaranteeing n -location-non-interference.

Fischer: objective

Objective

Automatically infer conditions over n , a , b , acc and ucs guaranteeing n -location-non-interference.

Put it differently: offer guarantees that the Fischer protocol will still be **valid** even in the situation of an attack on the variable v , with a maximum frequency n



In particular, since the reachable locations do not change, the location where both processes are in the critical section at the same time (**safety violation**) remains unreachable

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Parametric timed automata
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- 5 Case study
 - Fischer protocol
 - **IMITATOR in a nutshell**
 - Results
- 6 Perspectives

IMITATOR

- A tool for modeling and verifying **timed concurrent systems** with unknown constants modeled with **parametric timed automata**
 - Communication through (strong) broadcast synchronization
 - Rational-valued shared discrete variables
 - **Stopwatches**, to model schedulability problems with preemption
 - **Multi-rate** clocks
- Synthesis algorithms
 - (non-Zeno) parametric model checking (using a subset of **TCTL**)
 - Language and trace preservation, and robustness analysis
 - Parametric deadlock-freeness checking



IMITATOR

Under continuous development since 2008


[And+12]

A library of benchmarks

[And19]

- Communication protocols
- Schedulability problems
- Asynchronous circuits
- ...and more

Free and open source software: Available under the GNU-GPL license



[And+12] Étienne André, Laurent Fribourg, Ulrich Kühne, and Romain Soulat. “IMITATOR 2.5: A Tool for Analyzing Robustness in Scheduling Problems”. In: *FM* (Aug. 27–31, 2012). Vol. 7436. LNCS. Paris, France: Springer, Aug. 2012, pp. 33–36. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-32759-9_6

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
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Try it!

www.imitator.fr

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Some success stories

- Modeled and verified an **asynchronous memory circuit** by ST-Microelectronics
- Parametric schedulability analysis of a prospective architecture for the flight control system of the **next generation of spacecrafts** designed at ASTRIUM Space Transportation [Fri+12]
- Verification of software product lines [Lut+17]
- Formal timing analysis of **music scores** [FJ13]
- Solution to a challenge related to a **distributed video processing system** by Thales
- **Parametric timed pattern matching**

[Fri+12] Laurent Fribourg, David Lesens, Pierre Moro, and Romain Soulat. "Robustness Analysis for Scheduling Problems using the Inverse Method". In: *TIME* (Sept. 12–14, 2012). Leicester, UK: IEEE Computer Society Press, Sept. 2012, pp. 73–80. doi: 10.1109/TIME.2012.10

[Lut+17] Lars Luthmann, Andreas Stephan, Johannes Bürdek, and Malte Lochau. "Modeling and Testing Product Lines with Unbounded Parametric Real-Time Constraints". In: *SPLC, Volume A* (Sept. 25–29, 2017). Sevilla, Spain: ACM, 2017, pp. 104–113. doi: 10.1145/3106195.3106204

[FJ13] Léa Fanchon and Florent Jacquemard. "Formal Timing Analysis Of Mixed Music Scores". In: *ICMC* (Aug. 12–16, 2013). Perth, Australia: Michigan Publishing, Aug. 2013

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A modified model

Modified the model from [BT03]:

- Corrected some (non-trivial) aspects
 - Entirely rewrote the serializer (responsible for synchronizing the processes and the intruder)
- Added parameters, notably n
- Added the n -non-interference gadget

Target set of locations G :

- All locations except those where the mutual exclusion is violated (both processes in the critical section together)

Preliminary results

☹ Analysis with IMITATOR does not terminate

😊 ...but an **over-approximation** is synthesized

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- 😊 ...but an **over-approximation** is synthesized

Claim: this result might be **exact**

- 😊 We “tested” dozens of parameter valuations with UPPAAL [LPY97]
- ☹ No formal guarantee of soundness!

[LPY97] Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Paul Pettersson, and Wang Yi. “UPPAAL in a Nutshell”. In: *International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer* 1.1-2 (1997), pp. 134–152. DOI: 10.1007/s100090050010

Preliminary results

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One disjunct among the synthesized constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} & n \geq 0 \\ \wedge & \quad b \geq acc + n \\ \wedge & \quad b \geq 3 \times acc \\ \wedge & \quad a > 0 \\ \wedge & \quad acc > ucs > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Sources, binaries, models, results available at www.imitator.fr/static/ICECCS20

[LPY97] Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Paul Pettersson, and Wang Yi. “UPPAAL in a Nutshell”. In: *International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer* 1.1-2 (1997), pp. 134–152. DOI: 10.1007/s100090050010

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Conclusion and perspectives

Conclusion

- A first notion of **parametric n -non-interference**
- Helps to **quantify the admissible frequency** of attacks without any effect on the intended behavior
- Dually: quantify the effect of internal actions (by admins) without observable behavior from the outside
- **Approximated constraint** for Fischer protocol
 - Toolkit: IMITATOR

Conclusion and perspectives

Conclusion

- A first notion of **parametric n -non-interference**
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Perspectives:

- Theoretical issues: **decidable** subclasses?
- Non-interference w.r.t. the **language**
- Extend to **control** [Ben+15]

[Ben+15] Gilles Benattar, Franck Cassez, Didier Lime, and Olivier H. Roux. "Control and synthesis of non-interferent timed systems". In: *International Journal of Control* 88.2 (2015), pp. 217–236. doi: 10.1080/00207179.2014.944356

We hire!

- Who:
 - PhD students
 - Research fellows (post-doc)
- Project ANR-NRF ProMiS
 - quantitative formal methods + security (2020-2023)
- Where: France (Nancy / Nantes), Singapore

...starting anytime!

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